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Abstract
The technological singularity refers to a hypothetical scenario in which
technological advances virtually explode. The most popular scenario is the
creation of super-intelligent algorithms that recursively create ever higher in-
telligences. It took many decades for these ideas to spread from science ction
to popular science magazines and nally to attract the attention of serious
philosophers. David Chalmers' (JCS 2010) article is the rst comprehensive
philosophical analysis of the singularity in a respected philosophy journal.
The motivation of my article is to augment Chalmers' and to discuss some
issues not addressed by him, in particular what it could mean for intelligence
to explode. In this course, I will (have to) provide a more careful treatment of
what intelligence actually is, separate speed from intelligence explosion, com-
pare what super-intelligent participants and classical human observers might
experience and do, discuss immediate implications for the diversity and value
of life, consider possible bounds on intelligence, and contemplate intelligences
right at the singularity.
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\Within thirty years, we will have the technological means to create su-
perhuman intelligence. Shortly after, the human era will be ended."
| Vernor Vinge (1993)
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1 Introduction
The technological singularity is a hypothetical scenario in which self-accelerating
technological advances cause innite progress in nite time. The most popular
scenarios are an intelligence explosion [Goo65] or a speed explosion [Yud96] or a
combination of both [Cha10]. This quite plausibly is accompanied by a radically
changing society, which will become incomprehensible to us current humans close
to and in particular at or beyond the singularity. Still some general aspects may be
predictable.
Already the invention of the rst four-function mechanical calculator one-and-
a-half centuries ago [Tho47] inspired dreams of self-amplifying technology. With
the advent of general purpose computers and the eld of articial intelligence half-
a-century ago, some mathematicians, such as Stanislaw Ulam [Ula58], I.J. Good
[Goo65], Ray Solomono [Sol85], and Vernor Vinge [Vin93] engaged in singularity
thoughts. But it was only in the last decade that the singularity idea achieved
wide-spread popularity. Ray Kurzweil popularized the idea in two books [Kur99,
Kur05], and the Internet helped in the formation of an initially small community
discussing this idea. There are now annual Singularity Summits approaching a
thousand participants per year, and even a Singularity Institute.
The singularity euphoria seems in part to have been triggered by the belief that
intelligent machines that possess general intelligence on a human-level or beyond
can be built within our life time, but it is hard to tell what is cause and eect. For
instance, there is now a new conference series on Articial General Intelligence (AGI)
as well as some whole-brain emulation projects like Blue Brain [dGSGR10, GLA+10].
A loosely related set of communities which are increasing in momentum are the
\Immortalists" whose goal is to extend the human life-span, ideally indenitely.
Immortality and life-extension organizations are sprouting like mushrooms: e.g.
the Immortality and the Extropy Institute, the Humanity+ Association, and the
Alcor Life Extension, Acceleration Studies, Life Extension, Maximum Life, and
Methusalem Foundations.
There are many dierent potential paths toward a singularity. Most of them
seem to be based on software intelligence on increasingly powerful hardware. Still
this leaves many options, the major ones being mind uploading (via brain scan) and
subsequent improvement, knowledge-based reasoning and planning software (tradi-
tional AI research), articial agents that learn from experience (the machine learning
approach), self-evolving intelligent systems (genetic algorithms and articial life ap-
proach), and the awakening of the Internet (or digital Gaia scenario). Physical
and biological limitations likely do not allow singularities based on (non-software)
physical brain enhancement technologies such as drugs and genetic engineering.
Although many considerations in this article should be independent of the real-
ized path, I will assume a virtual software society consisting of interacting rational
agents whose intelligence is high enough to construct the next generation of more
intelligent rational agents. Indeed, one of the goals of the article is to discuss what
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(super)intelligence and rationality could mean in this setup. For concreteness, the
reader may want envisage an initial virtual world like Second Life that is similar to
our current real world and inhabited by human mind uploads.
Much has been written about the singularity and David Chalmers' article [Cha10]
covers quite wide ground. I essentially agree with all his statements, analysis, and
also share his personal opinions and beliefs. Most of his conclusions I will adopt with-
out repeating his arguments. The motivation of my article is to augment Chalmers'
and to discuss some issues not addressed by him, in particular what it could mean
for intelligence to explode. This is less obvious than it might appear, and requires
a more careful treatment of what intelligence actually is. Chalmers cleverly cir-
cumvents a proper discussion or denition of intelligence by arguing (a) there is
something like intelligence, (b) there are many cognitive capacities correlated with
intelligence, (c) these capacities might explode, therefore (d) intelligence might am-
plify and explode. While I mostly agree with this analysis, it does not tell us what a
society of ultra-intelligent beings might look like. For instance, if a hyper-advanced
virtual world looks like random noise for humans watching them from the \outside",
what does it mean for intelligence to explode for an outside observer? Conversely,
can an explosion actually be felt from the \inside" if everything is sped up uni-
formly? If neither insiders nor outsiders experience an intelligence explosion, has
one actually happened?
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briey recapitulates the most popu-
lar arguments why to expect a singularity and why \the singularity is near" [Kur05],
obstacles towards a singularity, and which choices we have. Section 3 describes how
an outside observer who does not participate in the singularity might experience the
singularity and the consequences he faces. This will depend on whether the singular-
ity is directed inwards or outwards. Section 4 investigates what a participant in the
singularity will experience, which is quite dierent from an outsider and depends on
details of the virtual society; in particular how resources are distributed. Section 5
takes a closer look at what actually explodes when computing power is increased
without limits in nite real time. While by denition there is a speed explosion, who,
if anyone at all, perceives an intelligence explosion/singularity depends on what is
sped up. In order to determine whether anyone perceives an intelligence explosion,
it is necessary to clarify what intelligence actually is and what super-intelligences
might do, which is done in Section 6. The considered formal theory of rational
intelligence allows investigating a wide range of questions about super-intelligences,
in principle rigorously mathematically. Section 7 elucidates the possibility that in-
telligence might be upper bounded, and whether this would prevent an intelligence
singularity. Section 8 explains how a society right at the edge of an intelligence
singularity might be theoretically studied with current scientic tools. Even when
setting up a virtual society in our image, there are likely some immediate dierences,
e.g. copying and modifying virtual structures, including virtual life, should be very
easy. Section 9 shows that this will have immediate (i.e. way before the singularity)
consequences on the diversity and value of life. Section 10 contains some personal
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remarks and Section 11 draws some conclusions.
I will use the following terminology throughout this article. Some terms are
taken over or rened from other authors and some are new:
 comp = computational resources
 singularity = innite change of an observable quantity in nite time
 intelligence explosion = rapidly increasing intelligence far beyond human level
 intelligence singularity = innite intelligence in nite time
 speed explosion/singularity = rapid/innite increase of computational re-
sources
 outsider = biological = non-accelerated real human watching a singularity
 insider = virtual = software intelligence participating in a singularity
 computronium = theoretically best possible computer per unit of matter
[Bre65]
 real/true intelligence = what we intuitively would regard as intelligence
 numerical intelligence = numerical measure of intelligence like IQ score
 AI = articial intelligence (used generically in dierent ways)
 AGI = articial general intelligence = general human-level intelligence or be-
yond.
 super-intelligence = AI+ = super-human intelligence [Cha10]
 hyper-intelligent = AI++ = incomprehensibly more intelligent than humans
 vorld = virtual world. A popular oxymoron is `virtual reality'
 virtual = software simulation in a computer.
I drop the qualier `virtual' if this does not cause any confusion, e.g. when talking
about a human in a vorld, I mean of course a virtual human.
I will assume a strong/physical form of the Church-Turing thesis that everything
in nature can be calculated by a Turing machine, i.e. our world including the human
mind and body and our environment are computable [Deu97, RH11]. So in the fol-
lowing I will assume without further argument that all physical processes we desire
to virtualize are indeed computational and can be simulated by a suciently pow-
erful (theoretical) computer. This assumption simplies many of the considerations
to follow, but is seldom essential, and could be lifted or weakened.
2 Will there be a Singularity
The current generations Y or Z may nally realize the age-old dream of creating
systems with human-level intelligence or beyond, which revived the interest in this
endeavor. This optimism is based on the belief that in 20{30 years the raw comput-
ing power of a single computer will reach that of a human brain and that software
will not lag far behind. This prediction is based on extrapolating Moore's law, now
valid for 50 years, which implies that comp doubles every 1.5 years. As long as
there is demand for more comp, Moore's law could continue to hold for many more
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decades before computronium is reached. Further, dierent estimates of the com-
putational capacity of a human brain consistently point towards 1015...1016 op/s
[Kur05]: Counting of neurons and synapses, extrapolating tiny-brain-part simula-
tions, and comparing the speech recognition capacities of computers to the auditory
cortex.
The most compelling argument for the emergence of a singularity is based on
Solomono's law [Sol85] which Yudkowski [Yud96] succinctly describes as follows:
\If computing speeds double every two years,
what happens when computer-based AIs are doing the research?
Computing speed doubles every two years.
Computing speed doubles every two years of work.
Computing speed doubles every two subjective years of work.
Two years after Articial Intelligences reach human equivalence, their
speed doubles. One year later, their speed doubles again.
Six months - three months - 1.5 months ... Singularity."
Interestingly, if this argument is valid, then Moore's law in a sense predicts its own
break-down; not the usually anticipated slow-down, but an enormous acceleration
of progress when measured in physical time.
The above acceleration would indeed not be the rst time of an enormous accel-
eration in growth. The economist Robin Hanson argues that \Dramatic changes in
the rate of economic growth have occurred in the past because of some technologi-
cal advancement. Based on population growth, the economy doubled every 250'000
years from the Paleolithic era until the Neolithic Revolution. This new agricultural
economy began to double every 900 years, a remarkable increase. In the current
era, beginning with the Industrial Revolution, the worlds economic output doubles
every fteen years, sixty times faster than during the agricultural era." Given the
increasing role of computers in our economy, computers might soon dominate it,
locking the economic growth pattern to computing speed, which would lead to a
doubling of the economy every two (or more precisely 1.5) years, another 10 fold
increase. If the rise of superhuman intelligences causes a similar revolution, argues
Hanson [Han08], one could expect the virtual economy to double on a monthly or
possibly on a weekly basis. So the technological singularity phenomenon would be
the next and possibly last growth acceleration. Ray Kurzweil is a master of produc-
ing exponential, double exponential, and singular plots [Kur05], but one has to be
wary of data selection, as Juergen Schmidhuber has pointed out.
Chalmers [Cha10] discusses various potential obstacles for a singularity to
emerge. He classies them into structural obstacles (limits in intelligence space,
failure to takeo, diminishing returns, local maxima) and manifestation obstacles
(disasters, disinclination, active prevention) and correlation obstacles. For instance,
self-destruction or a natural catastrophe might wipe out the human race [BC08].
Also, the laws of physics will likely prevent a singularity in the strict mathemat-
ical sense. While some physical theories in isolation allow innite computation in
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nite time (see Zeno machines [Wey27] and hypercomputation [Cop02] in general),
modern physics raises severe barriers [Bre65, Bek03, Llo00, Aar05]. But even if so,
today's computers are so far away from these limits, that converting our planet into
computronium would still result in a vastly dierent vorld, which is considered a
reasonable approximation to a true singularity. Of course, engineering diculties
and many other obstructions may stop the process well before this point, in which
case the end result may not account as a singularity but more as a phase transition
a la Hanson or even less spectacular.
Like Chalmers, I also believe that disinclination is the most (but not very) likely
defeater of a singularity. In the remainder of this article I will assume absence of
any such defeaters, and will only discuss the structural obstacles related to limits in
intelligence space later.
The appearance of the rst super-intelligences is usually regarded as the ignition
of the detonation cord towards the singularity { the point of no return. But it
might well be that a singularity is already now unavoidable. Politically it is very
dicult (but not impossible) to resist technology or market forces as e.g. the dragging
discussions on climate change vividly demonstrate, so it would be similarly dicult
to prevent AGI research and even more so to prevent the development of faster
computers. Whether we are before, at, or beyond the point of no return is also
philosophically intricate as it depends on how much free will one attributes to people
and society; like a spaceship close to the event horizon might in principle escape a
black hole but is doomed in practice due to limited propulsion.
3 The Singularity from the Outside
Let us rst view the singularity from the outside. What will observers who do not
participate in it \see". How will it aect them?
First, the hardware (computers) for increasing comp must be manufactured
somehow. As already today, this will be done by (real) machines/robots in fac-
tories. Insiders will provide blue-prints to produce better computers and better
machines that themselves produce better computers and better machines ad inni-
tum at an accelerated pace. Later I will explain why insiders desire more comp.
Non-accelerated real human (outsiders) will play a diminishing role in this process
due to their cognitive and speed limitations. Quickly they will only be able to pas-
sively observe some massive but incomprehensible transformation of matter going
on.
Imagine an inward explosion, where a xed amount of matter is transformed into
increasingly ecient computers until it becomes computronium. The virtual society
like a well-functioning real society will likely evolve and progress, or at least change.
Soon the speed of their aairs will make them beyond comprehension for the out-
siders. For a while, outsiders may be able to make records and analyze them in slow
motion with an increasing lag. Ultimately the outsiders' recording technology will
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not be sucient anymore, but some coarse statistical or thermodynamical proper-
ties could still be monitored, which besides other things may indicate an upcoming
physical singularity. I doubt that the outsiders will be able to link what is going on
with intelligence or a technological singularity anymore.
Insiders may decide to interact with outsiders in slow motion and feed them
with pieces of information at the maximal digestible rate, but even with direct
brain-computer interfaces, the cognitive capacity of a human brain is bounded and
cannot explode. A technologically augmented brain may explode, but what would
explode is the increasingly dominant articial part, rendering the biological brain
eventually superuous | a gradual way of getting sucked into the inside world. For
this reason, also intelligence amplication by human-computer interfaces are only
temporarily viable before they either break down or the extended human becomes
eectively virtual.
After a brief period, intelligent interaction between insiders and outsiders be-
comes impossible. The inside process may from the outside resemble a black hole
watched from a safe distance, and look like another interesting physical, rather than
societal, phenomenon.
This non-comprehensibility conclusion can be supported by an information-
theoretic argument: The characterization of our society as an information society
becomes even better, if not perfect, for a virtual society. There is lots of motivation
to compress information (save memory, extract regularities, and others), but it is
well-known [LV08] that maximally compressed information is indistinguishable from
random noise. Also, if too much information is produced, it may actually \collapse".
Here, I am not referring to the formation of black holes [Bek03], but to the fact that
a library that contains all possible books has zero information content (cf. the Li-
brary of Babel). Maybe a society of increasing intelligence will become increasingly
indistinguishable from noise when viewed from the outside.
Let us now consider outward explosion, where an increasing amount of
matter is transformed into computers of xed eciency (xed comp per unit
time/space/energy). Outsiders will soon get into resource competition with the
expanding computer world, and being inferior to the virtual intelligences, probably
only have the option to ee. This might work for a while, but soon the expansion
rate of the virtual world should become so large, theoretically only bounded by the
speed of light, that escape becomes impossible, ending or converting the outsiders'
existence.
So while an inward explosion is interesting, an outward explosion will be a threat
to outsiders. In both cases, outsiders will observe a speedup of cognitive processes
and possibly an increase of intelligence up to a certain point. In neither case will
outsiders be able to witness a true intelligence singularity.
Historically, mankind was always outward exploring; just in recent times it has
become more inward exploring. Now people more and more explore virtual worlds
rather than new real worlds. There are two reasons for this. First, virtual worlds
can be designed as one sees t and hence are arguably more interesting, and second,
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outward expansion now means deep sea or space, which is an expensive endeavor.
Expansion usually follows the way of least resistance.
Currently the technological explosion is both inward and outward (more and
faster computers). Their relative speed in the future will depend on external con-
straints. Inward explosion will stop when computronium is reached. Outward ex-
plosion will stop when all accessible convertible matter has been used up (all on
earth, or in our galaxy, or in our universe).
4 The Singularity from the Inside
Let us now consider the singularity from the inside. What will a participant expe-
rience?
Many things of course will depend on how the virtual world is organized. It is
plausible that various characteristics of our current society will be incorporated, at
least initially. Our world consists of a very large number of individuals, who possess
some autonomy and freedom, and who interact with each other and with their
environment in cooperation and in competition over resources and other things. Let
us assume a similar setup in a virtual world of intelligent actors. The vorld might
actually be quite close to our real world. Imagine populating already existing virtual
worlds like Second Life or World of Warcraft with intelligent agents simulating scans
of human brains.
Consider rst a vorld based on xed computational resources. As indicated,
initially, the virtual society might be similar to its real counter-part, if broadly
understood. But some things will be easier, such a duplicating (virtual) objects
and directed articial evolution. Other things will be harder or impossible, such
as building faster virtual computers and fancier gadgets reliant on them. This will
aect how the virtual society will value dierent things (the value of virtual life and
its implications will be discussed later), but I would classify most of this as a change,
not unlike in the real world when discovering or running out of some natural resource
or adapting to new models of society and politics. Of course, the virtual society, like
our real one, will also develop: there will be new inventions, technologies, fashions,
interests, art, etc., all virtual, all software, of course, but for the virtuals it will feel
real. If virtuals are isolated from the outside world and have knowledge of their
underlying computational processes, there would be no quest for a virtual theory of
everything [Hut10], since they would already know it. The evolution of this vorld
might include weak singularities in the sense of sudden phase transitions or collapses
of the society, but an intelligence explosion with xed comp, even with algorithmic
improvements seems implausible.
Consider now the case of a vorld with increasing comp. If extra comp is used for
speeding up the whole virtual world uniformly, virtuals and their virtual environment
alike, the inhabitants would actually not be able to recognize this. If their subjective
thought processes will be sped up at the same rate as their surroundings, nothing
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would change for them. The only dierence, provided virtuals have a window to the
outside real world, would be that the outside world slows down. If comp is sped
up hyperbolically, the subjectively innite future of the virtuals would t into nite
real time: For the virtuals, the external universe would get slower and slower and
ultimately come to a halt. Also outsiders would appear slower (but not dumber).
This speed-up/slow-down phenomenon is inverse compared to ying into a black
hole. An astronaut ying into a black hole will pass the Schwarzschild radius and
hit the singularity in nite subjective time. For an outside observer, though, the
astronaut gets slower and slower and actually takes innite time to vanish behind
the Schwarzschild radius.
If extra comp is exclusively used to expand the vorld and add more virtuals, there
is no individual speedup, and the bounded individual comp forces intelligence to stay
bounded, even with algorithmic improvements. But larger societies can also evolve
faster (more inventions per real time unit), and if regarded as a super-organism,
there might be an intelligence explosion, but not necessarily so: Ant colonies and
bee hives seem more intelligent than their individuals in isolation, but it is not
obvious how this scales to unbounded size. Also, there seems to be no clear positive
correlation between the number of individuals involved in a decision process and the
intelligence of its outcome.
In any case, the virtuals as individuals will not experience an intelligence ex-
plosion, even if there was one. The outsiders would observe virtuals speeding up
beyond comprehension and would ultimately not recognize any further intelligence
explosion.
The scenarios considered in this and the last section are of course only caricatures.
An actual vorld will more likely consist of a wide diversity of intelligences: faster
and slower ones, higher and lower ones, and a hierarchy of super-organisms and sub-
vorlds. The analysis becomes more complicated, but the fundamental conclusion
that an intelligence explosion might be unobservable does not change.
5 Speed versus Intelligence Explosion
The comparison of the inside and outside view has revealed that a speed explosion
is not necessarily an intelligence explosion. In the extreme case, insiders may not
experience anything and outsiders may witness only noise.
Consider an agent interacting with an environment. If both are sped up at the
same rate, their behavioral interaction will not change except for speed. If there is
no external clock measuring absolute time, there is no net eect at all.
If only the environment is sped up, this has the same eect as slowing down
the agent. This does not necessarily make the agent dumber. He will receive more
information per action, and can make more informed decisions, provided he is left
with enough comp to process the information. Imagine being inhibited by very
slowly responding colleagues. If you could speed them up, this would improve your
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own throughput, and subjectively this is the same as slowing yourself down. But
(how much) can this improve the agent's intelligence? In the extreme case, assume
the agent has instant access to all information, not much unlike we already have by
means of the Internet but much faster. Both usually increase the quality of decisions,
which might be viewed as an increase in intelligence. But intuitively there should
be a limit on how much information a comp-limited agent can usefully process or
even search through.
Consider now the converse and speed up the agent (or equivalently slow down
the environment). From the agent's view, he becomes deprived of information, but
has now increased capacity to process and think about his observations. He becomes
more reective and cognitive, a key aspect of intelligence, and this should lead to
better decisions. But also in this case, although it is much less clear, there might
be a limit to how much can be done with a limited amount of information.
The speed-up/slow-down eects might be summarized as follows:
Performance per unit real time:
 Speed of agent positively correlates with cognition and intelligence of decisions
 Speed of environment positively correlates with informed decisions
Performance per subjective unit of agent time from agent's perspective:
 slow down environment = increases cognition and intelligence but decisions
become less informed
 speed up environment = more informed but less reasoned decisions
Performance per environment time from environment perspective:
 speed up agent = more intelligent decisions
 slow down agent = less intelligent decisions
I have argued that more comp, i.e. speeding up hardware, does not necessar-
ily correspond to more intelligence. But then the same could be said of software
speedups, i.e. more ecient ways of computing the same function. If two agent al-
gorithms have the same I/O behavior, just one is faster than the other, is the faster
one more intelligent?
An interesting related question is whether progress in AI has been mainly due to
improved hardware or improved software. If we believe in the former, and we accept
that speed is orthogonal to intelligence, and we believe that humans are \truly"
intelligent (a lot of ifs), then building AGIs may still be far distant.
As detailed in Section 7, if intelligence is upper-bounded (like playing optimal
minimax chess), then past this bound, intelligences can only dier by speed and
available information to process. In this case, and if humans are not too far below
this upper bound (which seems unlikely), outsiders could, as long as their technology
permits, record and play a virtual world in slow motion and be able to grasp what
is going on inside.
In this sense, a singularity may be more interesting for outsiders than for insiders.
On the other hand, insiders actively \live" potential societal changes, while outsiders
only passively observe them.
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Of course, more comp only leads to more intelligent decisions if the decision algo-
rithm puts it to good use. Many algorithms in AI are so-called anytime algorithms
that indeed produce better results if given more comp. In the limit of innite comp,
in simple and well-dened settings (usually search and planning problems), some
algorithms can produce optimal results, but for more realistic complex situations
(usually learning problems), they saturate and remain sub-optimal [RN10]. But
there is one algorithm, namely AIXI described in Section 7, that is able to make
optimal decisions in arbitrary situations given innite comp.
Together this shows that it is non-trivial to draw a clear boundary between speed
and intelligence.
6 What is Intelligence
There have been numerous attempts to dene intelligence; see e.g. [LH07a] for a
collection of 70+ denitions from the philosophy, psychology, and AI literature, by
individual researchers as well as collective attempts.
If/since intelligence is not (just) speed, what is it then? What will super-
intelligences actually do?
Historically-biologically, higher intelligence, via some correlated practical cogni-
tive capacity, increased the chance of survival and number of ospring of an individ-
ual and the success of a species. At least for primates leading to homo sapiens this
was the case until recently. Within the human race, intelligence is now positively
correlated with power and/or economic success [Gea07] and actually negatively with
number of children [Kan07]. Genetic evolution has been largely replaced by memetic
evolution [Daw76], the replication, variation, selection, and spreading of ideas caus-
ing cultural evolution.
What activities could be regarded as or are positively correlated with
intelligence? Self-preservation? Self-replication? Spreading? Creating
faster/better/higher intelligences? Learning as much as possible? Understanding
the universe? Maximizing power over men and/or organizations? Transformation
of matter (into computronium?)? Maximum self-suciency? The search for the
meaning of life?
Has intelligence more to do with thinking or is thinking only a tool for act-
ing smartly? Is intelligence something anthropocentric or does it exist objectively?
What are the relations between other predicates of human \spirit" like conscious-
ness, emotions, and religious faith to intelligence? Are they part of it or separate
characteristics and how are they interlinked?
One might equate intelligence with rationality, but what is rationality? Reason-
ing, which requires internal logical consistency, is a good start for a characterization
but is alone not sucient as a denition. Indiscriminately producing one true state-
ment after the other without prioritization or ever doing anything with them is not
too intelligent (current automated theorem provers can already do this).
11
It seems hard if not impossible to dene rationality without the notion of a goal.
If rationality is reasoning towards a goal, then there is no intelligence without goals.
This idea dates back at least to Aristotle, if not further; see [LH07b] for details.
But what are the goals? Slightly more exible notions are that of expected util-
ity maximization and cumulative life-time reward maximization [RN10]. But who
provides the rewards, and how? For animals, one might try to equate the posi-
tive and negative rewards with pleasure and pain, and indeed one can explain a lot
of behavior as attempts to maximize rewards/pleasure. Humans seem to exhibit
astonishing exibility in choosing their goals and passions, especially during child-
hood. Goal-oriented behavior often appears to be at odds with long-term pleasure
maximization. Still, the evolved biological goals and desires to survive, procreate,
parent, spread, dominate, etc. are seldom disowned.
But who sets the goal for super-intelligences and how? When building AIs or
tinkering with our virtual selves, we could try out a lot of dierent goals, e.g. se-
lected from the list above or others. But ultimately we will lose control, and the
AGIs themselves will build further AGIs (if they were motivated to do so) and this
will gain its own dynamic. Some aspects of this might be independent of the initial
goal structure and predictable. Probably this initial vorld is a society of cooperat-
ing and competing agents. There will be competition over limited (computational)
resources, and those virtuals who have the goal to acquire them will naturally be
more successful in this endeavor compared to those with dierent goals. Of course,
improving the eciency of resource use is important too, e.g. optimizing own al-
gorithms, but still, having more resources is advantageous. The successful virtuals
will spread (in various ways), the others perish, and soon their society will consist
mainly of virtuals whose goal is to compete over resources, where hostility will only
be limited if this is in the virtuals' best interest. For instance, current society has
replaced war mostly by economic competition, since modern weaponry makes most
wars a loss for both sides, while economic competition in most cases benets the
better.
Whatever amount of resources are available, they will (quickly) be used up, and
become scarce. So in any world inhabited by multiple individuals, evolutionary
and/or economic-like forces will \breed" virtuals with the goal to acquire as much
(comp) resources as possible. This world will likely neither be heaven nor hell for
the virtuals. They will \like" to ght over resources, and the winners will \enjoy"
it, while the losers will \hate" it. In such evolutionary vorlds, the ability to survive
and replicate is a key trait of intelligence. On the other hand, this is not a sucient
characterization, since e.g. bacteria are quite successful in this endeavor too, but
not very intelligent.
Finally, let us consider some alternative (real or virtual) worlds. In the human
world, local conicts and global war is increasingly replaced by economic competi-
tion, which might itself be replaced by even more constructive global collaboration,
as long as violaters can quickly and eectively (and non-violently?) be eliminated.
It is possible that this requires a powerful single (virtual) world government, to give
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up individual privacy, and to severely limit individual freedom (cf. ant hills or bee
hives). An alternative societal setup that can only produce conforming individuals
might only be possible by severely limiting individual's creativity (cf. ock of sheep
or school of sh).
Such well-regulated societies might better be viewed as a single organism or col-
lective mind. Or maybe the vorld is inhabited from the outset by a single individual.
Both vorlds could look quite dierent and more peaceful than the traditional ones
created by evolution. Intelligence would have to be dened quite dierently in such
vorlds. Many science ction authors have conceived and extensively written about
a plethora of other future, robot, virtual, and alien societies in the last century.
In the following I will only consider vorlds shaped by evolutionary pressures as
described above.
7 Is Intelligence Unlimited or Bounded
Another important aspect of intelligence is how exible or adaptive an individual
is. Deep blue might be the best chess player on Earth, but is unable to do anything
else. On the contrary, higher animals and humans have remarkably broad capacities
and can perform well in a wide range of environments.
In [LH07b] intelligence has been dened as the ability to achieve goals in a wide
range of environments. It has been argued that this is a very suitable character-
ization, implicitly capturing most, if not all traits of rational intelligence, such as
reasoning, creativity, generalization, pattern recognition, problem solving, mem-
orization, planning, learning, self-preservation, and many others. Furthermore,
this denition has been rigorously formalized in mathematical terms. It is non-
anthropocentric, wide-range, general, unbiased, fundamental, objective, complete,
and universal. It is the most comprehensive formal denition of intelligence so
far. It assigns a real number  between zero and one to every agent, namely the
to-be-expected performance averaged over all environments/problems the agent po-
tentially has to deal with, with an Ockham's razor inspired prior weight for each
environment. Furthermore there is a maximally intelligent agent, called AIXI, w.r.t.
this measure. The precise formal denitions and details can be found in [LH07b],
but do not matter for our purpose. This paper also contains a comprehensive justi-
cation and defense of this approach.
The theory suggests that there is a maximally intelligent agent, or in other
words, that intelligence is upper bounded (and is actually lower bounded too). At
face value, this would make an intelligence explosion impossible.
To motivate this possibility, consider some simple examples. Assume the vorld
consists only of tic-tac-toe games, and the goal is to win or second-best not lose
them. The notion of intelligence in this simple vorld is beyond dispute. Clearly
there is an optimal strategy (actually many) and it is impossible to behave more
intelligently than this strategy. It is even easy to articially evolve or learn these
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strategies from repeated (self)play [Hoc03, VNH+11]. So in this vorld there clearly
will be no intelligence explosion or intelligence singularity, even if there were a speed
explosion.
We get a slightly dierent situation when we replace tic-tac-toe by chess. There
is also an optimal way of playing chess, namely minimax tree search to the end of
the game, but unlike in tic-tac-toe this strategy is computationally infeasible in our
universe. So in theory (i.e. given enough comp) intelligence is upper-bounded in a
chess vorld, while in practice we can get only ever closer but never reach the bound.
(Actually there might be enough matter in the universe to build an optimal chess
player, but likely not an optimal Go player. In any case it is easy to design a game
that is beyond the capacity of our accessible universe, even if completely converted
into computronium).
Still, this causes two potential obstacles for an intelligence explosion. First, we
are only talking about the speed of algorithms, which I explained before not to
equate with intelligence. Second, intelligence is upper bounded by the theoretical
optimal chess strategy, which makes an intelligence explosion dicult but not nec-
essarily impossible: Assume the optimal program has intelligence I = 1 and at real
time t < 1 we have access to or evolved a chess program with intelligence t. This
approaches 1 in nite time, but doesn't \explode". But if we use the monotone
transformation 1=(1   I) to measure intelligence, the chess program at time t has
transformed intelligence 1=(1  t) which tends to innity for t! 1. While this is a
mathematical singularity, it is likely not accompanied by a real intelligence explo-
sion. The original scale seems more plausible in the sense that t + 0:001 is just a
tiny bit more intelligent than t, and 1 is just 1000 times more intelligent than 0:001
but not innitely more. Although the vorld of chess is quite rich, the real world is
vastly and possibly unlimitedly richer. In such a more open world, the intelligence
scale may be genuinely unbounded, but not necessarily as we will see. It is not easy
though to make these arguments rigorous.
Let us return to the real world and intelligent measure  upper bounded by
max = (AIXI). Since AIXI is incomputable, we can never reach intelligence max
in a computational universe, but similarly to the chess example we can get closer and
closer. The numerical advance is bounded, and so is possibly the real intelligence
increase, hence no intelligence explosion. But it might also be the case that in a
highly sophisticated AIXI-close society, one agent beating another by a tiny epsilon
on the -scale makes all the dierence for survival and/or power and/or other
measurable impact like transforming the universe. In many sport contests split
seconds determine a win, and the winner takes it all | an admittedly weak analogy.
An interesting question is where humans range on the -scale: is it so low with
so much room above that outsiders would eectively experience an intelligence ex-
plosion (as far as recognizable), even if intelligence is ultimately upper bounded?
Or are we already quite close to the upper bound, so that even AGIs with enor-
mous comp (but comparable I/O limitations) would just be more intelligent but
not incomprehensibly so. We tend to believe that we are quite far from , but is
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this really so? For instance, what has once been argued to be irrational (i.e. not
very intelligent) behavior in the past, can often be regarded as rational w.r.t. the
appropriate goal. Maybe we are already near-optimal goal achievers. I doubt this,
but cannot rule it out either.
Humans are not faster but more intelligent than dogs, and dogs in turn are more
intelligent than worms and not just faster, even if we cannot pinpoint exactly why
we are more intelligent: is it our capacity to produce technology or to transform our
environment on a large scale or consciousness or domination over all other species?
There are no good arguments why humans should be close to the top of the possible
biological intelligence scale, and even less so on a vorld scale. By extrapolation it is
plausible that a vorld of much more intelligent trans-humans or machines is possible.
They will likely be able to perform better in an even wider range of environments
on an even wider range of problems than humans. Whether this results in anything
that deserves the name intelligence explosion is unclear.
8 Singularitarian Intelligences
Consider a vorld inhabited by competing agents, initialized with human mind-
uploads or non-human AGIs, and increasing comp per virtual. Sections 6 and 7
then indicate that evolutionary pressure increases the individuals' intelligence and
the vorld should converge to a society of AIXIs. Alternatively, if we postulate an
intelligence singularity and accept that AIXI is the most intelligent agent, we arrive
at the same conclusion. More precisely, the society consists of agents that aim at
being AIXIs only being constrained by comp. If this is so, the intelligence singularity
might be identied with a society of AIXIs, so studying AIXI can tell us something
about how a singularity might look like. Since AIXI is completely and formally
dened, properties of this society can be studied rigorously mathematically. Here
are some questions that could be asked and answered:
Will a pure reward maximizer such as AIXI listen to and trust a teacher? Likely
yes. Will it take drugs (i.e. hack the reward system)? Likely no, since cumulative
long-term reward would be small (death). Will AIXI replicate itself or procreate?
Likely yes, if AIXI believes that clones or descendants are useful for its own goals.
Will AIXI commit suicide? Likely yes (no), if AIXI is raised to believe in going to
heaven (hell) i.e. maximal (minimal) reward forever. Will sub-AIXIs self-improve?
Likely yes, since this helps to increase reward. Will AIXI manipulate or threaten
teachers to give more reward? Likely yes. Are pure reward maximizers like AIXI
egoists, psychopaths, and/or killers, or will they be friendly (altruism as extended
ego(t)ism)? Curiosity killed the cat and maybe AIXI, or is extra reward for curiosity
necessary? Immortality can cause laziness. Will AIXI be lazy? Can self-preservation
be learned or need (parts of) it be innate. How will AIXIs interact/socialize in
general?
For some of these questions, partial and informal discussions and plausible an-
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swers are available, and a couple have been rigorously dened, studied and answered,
but most of them are open to date [Hut05, Sch07, OR11, RO11, Hut12]. But the
AIXI theory has the potential to arrive at denite answers to various questions
regarding the social behavior of super-intelligences close to or at an intelligence
singularity.
9 Diversity Explosion and the Value of a Virtual
Life
As indicated, some things will be harder or impossible in a virtual world (e.g. to
discover new physics) but many things should be easier. Unless a global copy pro-
tection mechanism is deliberately installed (like e.g. in Second Life) or copyright
laws prevent it, copying virtual structures should be as cheap and eortless as it is
for software and data today. The only cost is developing the structures in the rst
place, and the memory to store and the comp to run them. With this comes the
possibility of cheap manipulation and experimentation.
It becomes particularly interesting when virtual life itself gets copied and/or
modied. Many science ction stories cover this subject, so I will be brief and
selective here. One consequence should be a \virtuan" explosion with life becoming
much more diverse. Andy Clarke [Cla09] writes (without particularly referring to
virtuals) that \The humans of the next century will be vastly more heterogenous,
more varied along physical and cognitive dimensions, than those of the past as we
deliberately engineer a new Cambrian explosion of body and mind." In addition,
virtual lives could be simulated in dierent speeds, with speeders experiencing slower
societal progress than laggards. Designed intelligences will ll economic niches. Our
current society already relies on specialists with many years of training, so it is
natural to go the next step to ease this process with \designer babies".
Another consequence should be that life becomes less valuable. Our soci-
ety values life, since life is a valuable commodity and expensive/laborious to re-
place/produce/raise. We value our own life, since evolution selects only organisms
that value their life. Our human moral code mainly mimics this, with cultural dif-
ferences and some excesses (e.g. suicide attacks on the one side and banning stem
cell research on the other).
If life becomes `cheap', motivation to value it will decline. Analogies are abun-
dant: Cheap machines decreased the value of physical labor. Some expert knowledge
was replaced by hand-written documents, then printed books, and nally electronic
les, where each transition reduced the value of the same information. Digital com-
puters made human computers obsolete. In games, we value our own life and that of
our opponents less than real life, not only because a game is a crude approximation
to real life, but also because games can be reset and one can be resurrected. Gov-
ernments will stop paying my salary when they can get the same research output
from a digital version of me, essentially for free.
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And why not participate in a dangerous fun activity if in the worst case I have
to activate a backup copy of myself from yesterday which just missed out this one
(anyway not too well-going) day. The belief in immortality can alter behavior dras-
tically.
Of course there will be countless other implications: ethical, political, econom-
ical, medical, cultural, humanitarian, religious, in art, warfare, etc. I have singled
out the value of life, since I think it will signicantly inuence other aspects. Much
of our society is driven by the fact that we highly value (human/individual) life.
If virtual life is/becomes cheap, these drives will ultimately vanish and be replaced
by other goals. If AIs can be easily created, the value of an intelligent individual
will be much lower than the value of a human life today. So it may be ethically
acceptable to freeze, duplicate, slow-down, modify (brain experiments), or even kill
(oneself or other) AIs at will, if they are abundant and/or backups are available,
just what we are used to doing with software. So laws preventing experimentation
with intelligences for moral reasons may not emerge. With so little value assigned
to an individual life, maybe it becomes a disposable.
10 Personal Remarks
I have deliberately avoided discussing consciousness for several reasons: David
Chalmers is the consciousness expert and not me, he has extensively written about
it in general and also in the context of the singularity [Cha10], and I essentially
agree with his assessments. Personally I believe in the functionalist theory of
identity and am condent that (slow and fast) uploading of a human mind pre-
serves identity and consciousness, and indeed that any suciently high intelligence,
whether real/biological/physical or virtual/silicon/software is conscious, and that
consciousness survives changes of substrate: teleportation, duplication, virtualiza-
tion/scanning, etc. along the lines of [Cha10].
I have also only considered (arguably) plausible scenarios, but not whether
these or other futures are desirable. First, there is the problem of how much in-
uence/choice/freedom we actually have in shaping our future in general and the
singularity in particular. Can evolutionary forces be beaten? Second, what is desir-
able is necessarily subjective. Are there any universal values or qualities we want to
see or that should survive? What do I mean by we? All humans? Or the dominant
species or government at the time the question is asked? Could it be diversity? Or
friendly AI [Yud08]? Could the long-term survival of at least one conscious species
that appreciates its surrounding universe be a universal value? A discussion of these
questions is clearly beyond the scope of this article.
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11 Conclusions
Based on the deliberations in this paper, here are my predictions concerning a poten-
tial technological singularity, although admittedly they have a speculative character.
 This century may witness a technological explosion of a degree deserving the
name singularity.
 The default scenario is a society of interacting intelligent agents in a virtual
world, simulated on computers with hyperbolically increasing computational
resources.
 This is inevitably accompanied by a speed explosion when measured in physical
time units, but not necessarily by an intelligence explosion.
 Participants will not necessarily experience this explosion, since/if they are
themselves accelerated at the same pace, but they should enjoy `progress' at
a `normal' subjective pace.
 For non-accelerated non-participating conventional humans, after some short
period, their limited minds will not be able to perceive the explosion as an
intelligence explosion.
 This begs the question in which sense an intelligence explosion has happened.
(If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a
sound?)
 One way and maybe the only way to make progress in this question is to clarify
what intelligence actually is.
 The most suitable notion of intelligence for this purpose seems to be that of
universal intelligence, which in principle allows to formalize and theoretically
answer a wide range of questions about super-intelligences. Accepting this
notion has in particular the following implications:
 There is a maximally intelligent agent, which appears to imply that intelligence
is fundamentally upper bounded, but this is not necessarily so.
 If the virtual world is inhabited by interacting free agents (rather than a
`monistic' vorld inhabited by a single individual or a tightly controlled so-
ciety), evolutionary pressures should breed agents of increasing intelligence
that compete about computational resources.
 The end-point of this intelligence evolution/acceleration (whether it deserves
the name singularity or not) could be a society of these maximally intelligent
individuals.
 Some aspects of this singularitarian society might be theoretically studied with
current scientic tools.
 Way before the singularity, even when setting up a virtual society in our image,
there are likely some immediate dierences, for instance that the value of an
individual life suddenly drops, with drastic consequences.
Acknowledgements. Thanks to Wolfgang Schwarz and Reinhard Hutter for feed-
back on earlier drafts.
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